The Space in between: Mission as Reconciliation

JOHN D'ARCY MAY

Farewelling a colleague recently, an American Mennonite who has spent over twenty years in Ireland, studying Irish history and doing innovative research on overcoming sectarianism,[1] it occurred to me that I had long thought of him and his wife as missionaries – but in a sense quite different from the Irish missionaries who went out to distant continents to make converts to Christianity. While his wife worked with disadvantaged children in a depressed area of Dublin, my colleague endured the frustrations of trying to get groups of Catholics and Protestants in the polarised urban ghettos and country towns of Northern Ireland and the border counties to come together and stay together as they confronted their stereotypes of one another. His work was not so much evangelisation as reconciliation, and that, I now realise, made him a missionary in a new – we might say 'post-modern' – sense.

He might also be called a post-colonial missionary. The legacy of Christianity's liaisons with colonialism has made 'mission' synonymous with the destruction of indigenous cultures and the imposition of Western values and institutions, an historical mistake the West should be ashamed of. While companies and other organisations, already oblivious of this heritage, frame their 'mission statements', mission has become almost unmentionable in many theological circles. The 'discovery' of what was to Europeans a New World by Columbus in 1492 marked the beginning of an era in

which evangelisation was closely bound up with conquista. Once
the Protestant powers of Europe joined the race for colonies, nati-
onalism and denominationalism marched arm in arm through
much of Asia, all of Africa and across the Pacific. In the footsteps
of the Catholic Spanish and the Calvinist Dutch, the Lutheran Ger-
mans, Catholic French and Anglican or Free Church British carved
out ecclesiastical enclaves just as their colonial sponsors had car-
ved out trading enclaves. The latter sought raw materials and mar-
kets while the former tried to win 'souls'.

Evangelisation in such a context became identical with 'spatia-
lisation': Europeans re-imagined the world as contiguous territori-
es owned and controlled by them, and these in turn created the
spaces for evangelisation. The nations and Churches thus created
were meant to be carbon copies of their European exemplars, but
the states that eventually emerged after painful and often violent
struggles for independence were 'soft states' (Gunnar Myrdal),
flaunting the trappings of democracy and the rule of law but eco-
nomically dependent on their former colonial masters and politi-
cally unstable.

When I used this term at a farewell conference for a German
Lutheran colleague from Papua New Guinea he interjected: 'Soft
churches?', and I found myself saying, why not? Catholic missions,
by and large, remain largely Western in personnel and appearan-
ce, but Protestant missions were usually intended to become
'localised' autonomous Churches from the start, and the ways in
which they achieved this were often pioneering.[2] But the resulting
indigenous Churches, to the extent that they are truly indigenous,
often find themselves riven by internal conflicts over authenticity
and administration and in tension with their overseas 'mother
Churches', who still contribute much of their financial support.[3] If
'globalisation' means the definitive domination of the world by
Western mentalities and technologies, then the great Catholic and
Protestant missionary eras now look like a kind of Christian glo-
balisation; but these eras are now over. The time in which missi-
on meant maximising the Gospel's sphere of influence by starting
from a securely held 'centre' – the Christianities of Europe and the
West – is no more. Europe itself is now increasingly recognised as
'mission territory', whether that means the invasion of Eastern
Europe by evangelistic groups (even the re-ordering of dioceses

by Rome was interpreted by the Russian Orthodox as proselytism!⁴) or the proliferation of *ad hoc* mini-Churches and neo-pagan revivals in the midst of Western European religious pluralism. The liason with colonialism has been replaced by complicity with capitalism as American Pentecostals and Evangelicals 'market' Christianity using all the sophisticated techniques of media-driven fundraising. Globalisation as spatial expansion has now been replaced by occupation of the 'virtual space' through which finance, information and entertainment flow; evangelisation, too, is now being transformed from physical presence into virtual presence in the 'real virtuality' of the global public forum.⁵

Yet we must never forget that old-fashioned evangelisation did 'proclaim good news', transforming individual lives and pacifying hostile communities. With great personal sacrifice the missionaries did 'bear witness' to a freely given love that saves and a peace that heals, as happened among the warring tribes of New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific Islands and as continues to happen today through communities of reconciliation like Corrymeela and Glencree in Ireland or San' Egidio and the Focolarini of Chiara Lubich internationally. It was precisely the 'success' of evangelisation during the great missionary eras that made Christianity a 'world religion', but this has also left us a legacy of 'ecumenical' problems in the original meaning of the word: problems that result from Christianity's polycentric presence throughout the whole inhabited world (*oikoumene*). Christianities are in conflict and Christians are estranged along lines which have little to do with the classical ecclesiastical divisions (Latin West, Orthodox East; Roman Catholicism, varieties of Protestantism). The white/black, rich/poor, centre/periphery polarities are a direct inheritance of the missionary past, while those between men/women, straight/gay and healthy/disabled have become Church-dividing factors in modern contexts. As a result, while post-colonial conflicts continue in post-missionary Churches – the divisions in the Methodist Church of Fiji over the presence in government of ethnic Indians who are either Hindu or Muslim is a dramatic example – the reverse flow of Christians from former mission countries back to the West creates a proliferation of new Churches such as the Black Churches in Britain and America or the ethnic immigrant Churches in Australia and New Zealand.

Meanwhile, the 'parent' Churches threaten to tear themselves apart over issues which leave their missionary offspring shaking their heads uncomprehendingly (the proposed ordination of gays and lesbians in the Anglican Church in England or the Uniting Church in Australia is a case in point, but there are many other such issues in the fields of bioethics and medical ethics).

What is the answer to these new challenges from a missionary point of view? There are those who would redefine mission as development, relief work, health care or education in order to avoid any implication of proselytism. But in these fields there is every danger that the old missionary problem of imposing one's values and institutions on those one wants to help will repeat itself in secular form. The avoidance of conversion by coercion (*Bekehrung* or proselytism) does not preclude aiming at conversion as *metanoia* (*Umkehr* or a radical and liberating change of heart and mind). But today such radical conversion need not imply abandoning one religious identity in order to take on another, 'leaving' one Church or religion in order to 'join' a different one; it may also take the form of dual or even multiple religious belonging, so that one hears of 'Catholic Evangelicals', 'Hindu Christians' or 'Buddhist Jews', just as there have always been many people of indeterminate religious identity in China and Japan.[6] This, it seems to me, gives us a clue to the possible future shape of mission as reconciliation.

The 'space' of mission, I would suggest, is no longer the geographical space of territorial expansion or even the virtual space of the new electronic media, but the space 'in between' those who are estranged or at enmity, even in violent conflict. Mission is happening in the interstices of the global system, in spaces where, given patience, skilful mediation and God's grace, miracles of reconciliation can occur. In Australia, 'reconciliation' has long since established itself on the political agenda as the great national collaborative task of healing the hurt of white invasion, cultural dispossession and family separation; the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has become an international landmark, not least because it combined indigenous and Christian ways of confronting the past, making restitution and in some cases forgiving; the process of reconciliation after of eight years of civil war on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougain-

ville has yielded moving examples of the same combination of indigenous and Christian inspiration as well as resulting in almost complete disarmament; in Northern Ireland the process of reconciliation, both political and religious, though far from complete, has reached the point where it can be comprehensively studied in a comparative framework.[7]

Reconciliation in such contexts – and consequently mission, if my hypothesis is correct – can only be conceived as radical non-violence. It is the witness given to a love that suffers rather than requite injustice and that can thus inspire gratuitous forgiveness. It is a witness that can counteract the logic of reciprocal retribution, whether in the 'payback' system of Melanesian cultures or the cult of revenge in the post-Christian West. In a post-colonial, post-missionary situation, mission has been set free from the constraints and compromises of the past to become the witness of reconciliation. Gandhi's 'soul force' (*satyagraha*, literally 'dwelling in the truth' by refusing to retaliate) and Martin Luther King's non-violent struggle for civil rights are its precursors; the endemic violence of the conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans and Northern Ireland are testimonies to what can happen in its absence.

Mission as reconciliation, like politics, is always local and context-specific: there is no such thing as forgiveness 'in general'! Yet it is not just a matter of reconciling individuals – often ethnic or religious groups are involved, as in Indian 'communalism' – and it often has to come to grips with global factors such as fundamentalism and what has been called the 'market state' (Archbishop Rowan Williams in his 2003 Dimbleby Lecture). The love to which mission as reconciliation bears witness must be shown to transcend the twin idols of *Blut und Boden:* the 'blood' of ethnic identity regarded as a guarantee of superiority and the 'soil' of territorial attachment (such as the Land of Israel or the sacred ground of Kosovo; it was the indigenous ideology of land as a sacred inheritance, *taukei,* that so bedevilled the Christian response to the 1987 military coups in Fiji and the subsequent constitutional crisis). Precisely as local this witness must also be communicable to the whole oikoumene and must be able to be acknowledged as Christian witness to Gospel values: it is witness to the whole Church (*kath' holon,* 'catholic'). It is in fact neither more

nor less than 'realised catholicity', the full living out of the redemptive love celebrated in the Eucharist by all Christians in every place.[8]

The globalised public space of post-modernity, then, created in the course of colonisation and its accompanying evangelisation of almost the entire globe, offers plenty of scope for the ministry of reconciliation at both local and global levels. Europe, whose wars and revolutions repeatedly spilled over into the rest of the world during the twentieth century's 'long war' (1914-1989), has now structured itself as a zone of peace in which military conflict among members of the European Union is increasingly unthinkable (though Greece and Turkey are an embarrassment, the future role of the Balkan states is uncertain, and Northern Ireland always was and still is a European conflict). But if we look around the rest of the world, it is remarkable how many of the endemic conflicts whose protracted violence seems to defy mediation have their roots in European colonial practices, now augmented by American neo-imperialism and the hegemonic ambitions of states like Indonesia and China.

It is of course well beyond the scope of individual missionaries and their para-church organisations to mediate effectively at this level; even the Catholic Church, with its curious combination of diplomacy and theology, is only able to intervene sporadically, as in the pope's attempts to prevent war in Iraq. But we must not be daunted by the size of this task, because it is normally not in the public space where international relations and interreligious dialogue intersect, but in the spaces *in between* the great players and the embittered combatants, the perpetrators and their victims, that the ministry of reconciliation can be most effective. Gandhi once remarked: "The only people on earth who do not see Christ and his teachings as non-violent are Christians".[9] It is precisely in post-missionary conflict situations that the realisation dawns on us that the Gospel is in fact a testament of non-violence. And this violence is not restricted to civil wars, terrorism and the interventions of great powers. At all levels in all societies violence seems to be spreading as alienated individuals and disaffected groups lash out in frustration at those who seem to 'have it all' whereas they can only nurse their grievances. In such a situation of generalised insecurity, both local and global, the ministry

of reconciliation – under certain conditions yet to be defined – becomes the most distinctive form of witness to the Gospel. But in order to offer this witness credibly, we Christians have a lot of soul-searching and historical homework to do.

The act of conversion itself, the attempt to interfere with well-formed individual and cultural identities and bring about change, whether by coercion or persuasion, is now seen to be not just the precursor but the primordial form of violence.[10] Increasingly, 'the monotheisms', as the Abrahamic traditions of Jews, Christians and Muslims are somewhat loosely called, are accused of being intrinsically violent because they worship a violent God.[11] Here Christians need to embark on painful deconstructions of some very basic convictions. The concept of God as an all-powerful sanctioner of righteous violence has become the idol of powerful Churches and now underpins what my colleague Bill McSweeney calls 'the theology of American foreign policy'. The notion of substitutionary sacrifice – that human guilt is so great that nothing less than the violent death of God's own Son in our place can expiate it by appeasing the divine anger – does not so much transform as succumb to the ideology of retaliatory violence.

These tasks in turn stir up whole nests of neglected missiological questions: can indigenous notions of retributive justice be Christianised by assimilating them to the sacrifice of Christ, or does this amount to a 're-paganising' of the Christian theology of redemptive sacrifice?[12] The argument turns around two difficult and controversial issues, one anthropological, the other theological: whether the ritual killings found in Melanesian and most other indigenous cultures are in fact 'sacrifices', and whether Jesus' submission to the violence of the cross was in fact the sacrifice that transcends all sacrifice and breaks the cycle of retaliatory violence once and for all.[13] We cannot pursue these questions here, but they show the depths to which the theology of reconciliation takes us. In the post-colonial context both the churches' long-standing commitment to the doctrine of just war and the witness of the historic 'peace churches' (Mennonites, Quakers, Amish) are being re-evaluated.[14]

In confronting these issues it is important to be clear that reconciliation is not a 'soft option': it is not a substitute for justice but presupposes it, and it involves us in the extremely sensitive

question of forgiveness. Reconciliation in no way implies supp-
ressing the memory of violence and injustice, but rather insists on
victims and perpetrators alike confronting the truth of past and
present injustice in order to build a new relationship. Reconcilia-
tion is thus not an alternative to liberation but a crucial step on
the way towards it; indeed, reconciliation could become the new
form of liberation theology, for it is forgiveness that sets us free
to shape our future together.[15] Nor is reconciliation to be confu-
sed with professional mediation, the management of conflict with
the help of experts who stand outside it. Such attempts can have
the effect of antagonising the combatants still further, for what dri-
ves their violence is usually the deep-seated fear that they will be
alienated from their traditions and their identity destroyed.[16] The
work of reconciliation begins with the conviction that the parties
to a conflict, no matter how bitter and violent, themselves possess
the resources to master their fears and dismantle their stereotypes,
if only the grace of forgiveness can be allowed to penetrate the
space in between their antagonisms and grievances.[17]

At the core of the theology of reconciliation – and conse-
quently of the new missiology – is the delicate problem of forgi-
veness. There can be no real reconciliation which transforms con-
flict and transcends violence without forgiveness. But who can
ask forgiveness? Anyone who has been really hurt, even in a fami-
ly feud or a misunderstanding between colleagues, let alone those
who have lost loved ones or sustained injuries in violent conflicts,
knows how immeasurably difficult it can be to forgive. Faced with
the impossibility of forgiveness, it is not enough to say "Don't
worry, God's grace will heal your wounds and open your heart".
There is no place for what Dietrich Bonhoeffer called 'cheap
grace' in the mysterious process that leads to forgiveness. Indeed,
the Catholic Church's misuse of the 'forgiveness of sins' as an
instrument of power played a central part in the Reformation
revolt, which led Protestants to conceive of both sin and forgi-
veness 'vertically', as an affair between the individual sinner and
God. What was lost was an understanding of the social dimensi-
on of forgiveness and the need to involve both victim and per-
petrator, with priority being given to the victim.[18] If repentance on
the part of perpetrators is to go beyond mere restitution to
acknowledge blame and set about rebuilding relationships for a

better future, conditions must be created in which victims can for-
give, though the act of forgiveness itself is beyond human control
and marks the entry point of divine grace into the negative space
of antagonism and grievance, shame and guilt. The risk is that,
when the pain of shame encounters the pain of grievance, the
request for forgiveness does not necessarily call forth forgiveness,
and the act of forgiveness does not necessarily result in repen-
tance.

Yet it is at this point of greatest sensitivity that the true dimen-
sions of the new missionary task become apparent, for the missi-
onary as reconciler must aim at nothing less than a positive new
beginning based on a promise, a new covenant, not just between
individuals but in certain circumstances between ethnic groups
and social classes. 'Re-membering' now implies not just facing the
past but restoring community. It is the inability to cope with 'deep
remembering' on this scale that makes politics so aggressive and
reactionary, as the Australian government's refusal to apologise to
Aboriginal people for the hurt done them in the past eloquently
testifies. Yet such reconciliation is happening, usually in local con-
texts such as Bougainville or Northern Ireland, but on such a scale
that local reconciliation is already a significant political factor in
the new global public sphere.

In speaking this way about forgiveness, about the love that
"liberates and redeems by not requiting evil" and thereby bears
witness to the fact that "[i]f God really could not forgive, then God
would actually be powerless against the law of retribution",[19] we
find ourselves very close to the ideal of the Bodhisattva in Budd-
hism. The Bodhisattva is an enlightened person who renounces
the final consummation in the peace of *nirvana* out of compassi-
on for all suffering creatures. The Bodhisattva radiates the com-
passionate love (*metta-karunâ*) of a purified mind to all, perpe-
trators and victims, evil and good, human and non-human, becau-
se all are ultimately interdependent; in the words of Thich Nhat
Hanh, we all 'inter-are' and no-one can stand outside or above
another. The extent to which this compassion includes the love
that forgives could be fruitfully explored in the Buddhist-Christian
dialogue.

It now becomes apparent that the question of reconciliation
and forgiveness as the new form of mission inevitably throws up

the whole problem of the dialogue of religions. In a world now
fully aware of its religious plurality it is obvious to all but the most
benighted fundamentalists that no one religious tradition on its
own can meet the challenge of reconciliation on the scale we
have indicated. The fact that so much violent conflict is between
religions or is fuelled by religious convictions is enough in itself
to discredit the religions as agents of reconciliation. Yet it is the
religions that have traditionally offered the transcendent perspec-
tives, the moral teachings and the exemplary practitioners of non-
violence, all of which makes them indispensable in defining
peace, enabling forgiveness and bringing about reconciliation,
both globally and locally. Many of the world's 'militants for peace'
are religiously inspired, from informal groups and locally based
movements (such as the Corrymeela Community in Northern Ire-
land, the Community of San' Egidio, the International Network of
Engaged Buddhists or the Fellowship of Reconciliation) to trans-
national institutions with the resources of the Roman Catholic
Church, the World Council of Churches or the World Conference
on Religion and Peace.[20]

Some of the qualities required of peacemakers, however, whet-
her as external-disinterested or internal-partisan mediators, pre-
sent a considerable challenge when we transpose them to the reli-
gions themselves with their various sects and denominations:
acknowledgement of the mediator's vulnerability and self-doubt;
discernment of the interpersonal values of one's own culture and
others'; the conviction that these values have peacemaking poten-
tial, no matter how passionate the rage and fanaticism of extre-
mist groups. These are the ingredients of what John Paul Lede-
rach calls 'elicitive peacemaking', but they must be seen in the
context of the crucial dilemma of religions in conflict as discerned
by Marc Gopin: the authentic expression of one's own religiosity
vs. unconditional respect for others'; the need to be unique vs. the
need to integrate.[21] One could hardly express more pointedly the
ways in which 'mission' and 'dialogue' intersect. In order to be
credible, the dialogue of religions must be intrinsically non-vio-
lent. Not the dualism of Crusade vs. Jihad, but the non-dualism of
repentance and forgiveness in reconciliation, perhaps even to the
point of multiple religious belonging in a world that is both glo-
bal and plural, is the new missionary horizon.

Noter

[1] Now published as: Joseph Liechty and Cecelia Clegg, *Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001).

[2] An example is the not uncontroversial work of the Lutheran missionary Christian Keysser in New Guinea, who aimed at the integral evangelisation of entire ethnic groups rather than concentrating on individual conversions; see Theodor Ahrens, "Die Aktualität Christian Keyssers. Eine Fallstudie protestantischer Mission", *id., Der neuer Mensch im kolonialen Zwielicht. Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Ozeanien* (Münster-Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1993), 29-44, and, on the Church that eventually emerged from the Lutheran mission to Melanesia, Herwig Wagner and Hermann Reiner, eds., *The Lutheran Church in Papua New Guinea: The First Hundred Years 1886-1986* (Adelaide: Lutheran Publishing House, 1986).

[3] For a dramatic study of an indigenous Church thrust into 'real' as opposed to 'formal' independence, see Theodor Ahrens, "Melanesian Christianity Between and Betwixt the Local and the Global", i*d., Grace and Reciprocity: Missiological Studies* (Goroka, Papua New Guinea: The Melanesian Institute, Point Series No. 26, 2002), 116-130.

[4] See Walter Kardinal Kasper, "Ökumene zwischen Ost und West. Stand und Perspektiven des Dialogs mit den orthodoxen Kirchen", *Stimmen der Zeit* 2003/3, 150-164, 155-158.

[5] See Robert Schreiter, *The New Catholicity: Theology Between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997). The term 'real virtuality' was coined by Manuel Castells; see J.D. May, "God in Public: The Religions in Pluralist Societies", *Bijdragen* [forthcoming]; *id.,* "Contested Space: Alternative Models of the Public Sphere in the Asia-Pacific", Neil Brown and Robert Gascoigne, eds., *Faith in the Public Forum* (Adelaide: Australian Theological Forum, 1999), 78-108.

[6] See Catherine Cornille, ed., *Many Mansions? Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002).

[7] The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, has inaugurated an M.Phil. programme in Reconciliation Studies, taught in Belfast; see J.D. May, "A Rationale for Reconciliation", *Uniting Church Studies* 7/1 (2001), 1-13.

[8] See J.D. May, "Realised Catholicity: The Incarnational Dimension of Multiculturalism", *The Australasian Catholic Record* 76 (1999), 419-429.

[9] Quoted by Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 216.

[10] The theme runs through the missiological reflections of Theodor Ahrens, *Mission nachdenken. Studien* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2002), esp. 26-27, 34, 105-106 and the concluding essay, "Das Kreuz mit der Gewalt. Religiöse Dimensionen der Gewaltproblematik", 199-232.

[11] Reading the Book of Isaiah in the weeks prior to and during the Second Gulf War in early 2003 I was powerfully reminded of the long history of religiously sanctioned violence in the Middle East. Regina Schwartz, prompted by her student's remark: "What about the Canaanites?", was similarly moved to write

The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

[12] See the controversy between Theodor Ahrens, "On Grace and Reciprocity: A Fresh Approach to Contextualisation with Reference to Christianity in Melanesia", *id., Grace and Reciprocity*, 360-380, and Ennio Mantovani, *International Review of Mission* 90 (2001), 462-464, replying to the original publication of Ahrens's article in that journal, *IRM* 89 (2000), 515-528, and my discussion of the problem in J.D. May, *Transcendence and Violence: The Encounter of Buddhist, Christian and Primal Traditions* (New York and London: Continuum, 2003), 59-61.

[13] This is the well known thesis of René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), which I for one find unconvincing as an interpretation of the New Testament and exaggerated as an explanation of the origin of all religion, despite Girard's immense learning and fascinating textual analyses. See the discerning remarks of Wink, *Engaging the Powers,* 152-155.

[14] See Wink, *Engaging the Powers*, chapter 11, and my discussion in J.D. May, *After Pluralism: Towards and Interreligious Ethic* (Münster-Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 2000), 23-29.

[15] This is the title of an incisive study of the theology of forgiveness by Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, *Vergebung macht frei. Vorschläge für eine Theologie der Versöhnung* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 1996); the English version, *The Art of Forgiveness: Theological Reflections on Healing and Reconciliation* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1997), is not so much a translation as a re-writing of the original.

[16] These misconceptions have been helpfully clarified by Robert Schreiter, *Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 18-27.

[17] No-one, to my mind, has brought this out more vividly and convincingly than Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Gopin speaks of the "prosocial" potential of religions, 59, noting, however, that what the parties to religiously-inspired conflicts fear most is "cultural annihilation by assimilation", 175.

[18] This is a key thesis of Müller-Fahrenholz, *The Art of Forgiveness,* whose argument I summarise in what follows.

[19] Ahrens, *Mission nachdenken*, 224-225: "Die Liebe erlöst, indem sie das Böse nicht vergilt. … Wenn Gott nicht wirklich vergeben könnte, dann ware er in der Tat ohnmächtig gegenüber dem Gesetz der Retribution".

[20] See R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), for an impressive survey of the religions' peacemaking potential.

[21] See Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon*, 202-203.